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Abstract 
Many studies of labour market dynamics use survey data so it is valuable to know about the quality 
of the data collected. This paper investigates job transitions in Ireland over the period 1995 to 2001, 
using the Living in Ireland Survey, the Irish component of the European Community Household 
Panel. In applied work on job mobility, researchers often have to rely on self-reported accounts of 
tenure to determine whether or not a job change has taken place. There may be measurement error 
in these responses and consequently observations may be misclassified. The paper finds that there 
are substantial inconsistencies or measurement error in the responses used to determine job 
changes so there is a risk of misclassifying cases as being job changes when truly they are job stays 
and vice versa. The paper explores the impact of misclassification in a model of job change using an 
estimator developed by Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998). It finds that ignoring 
misclassification may substantially underestimate the true number of job changes and it can lead to 
diminished covariate effects. The paper then investigates the relationship between job mobility and 
wage growth. Misclassification in a binary explanatory variable causes attenuation in OLS estimates. 
A two-step approach to controlling for misclassification in job changes is adopted to estimate the 
wage effects of job mobility. The paper finds that controlling for misclassification has a substantial 
impact on the estimated effect of changing jobs on wage growth. 
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Many studies of labour market dynamics use survey data. Therefore it is important to know about 
the quality of the data collected. There may be ambiguity in a survey question, respondents may 
misunderstand the question, they may have an incentive to misreport, they may have poor recall or 
responses may be coded incorrectly. This paper investigates job mobility or, more specifically, 
employer changes over the period 1995 to 2001 using the Living in Ireland Survey (LIS), the Irish 
component of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). As is common with many surveys, 
there is no direct question in the LIS about job mobility; instead it is inferred from the responses of 
individuals to a question about tenure. The paper describes a potentially serious measurement error 
problem in the responses used to determine job changes. As a result, there is a risk of misclassifying 
cases as being job changes when truly no change has taken  place and vice versa.1 
The effect of a potentially misclassified job change dummy variable is examined in two cases: (1) 
where it is the dependent variable in a model examining the determinants of job change and (2) in a 
wage model where it is a regressor. Ignoring misclassification in estimating the determinants of job 
mobility can lead to estimates that are biased and inconsistent. A modified probit estimator 
developed by Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) is used to control for misclassification in 
the dependent variable. The paper finds that ignoring misclassification leads to the true number of 
job changes being substantially underestimated and to diminished covariate effects.  
Then the relationship between job mobility and wage growth in Ireland and how it is affected by 
measurement error is explored. Most applied research on job mobility and wages tends to focus on 
issues such as whether heterogeneity in some unobserved individual characteristic can account for 
the effect of mobility on wages and/or address the possible two-way causation between job mobility 
and wage growth. These issues are also addressed here. Generally, studies find a positive wage 
effect of around 10 per cent associated with changing jobs which serves as a useful reference point 
for this paper. Campbell (2001) finds that the wage gain connected to changing jobs over a three-
year period is around 10 per cent in the UK. Topel and Ward (1992) report a 10 per cent return to 
mobility for young men in the US. Abbott and Beach (1994) find that the average wage gain for 
Canadian women who change jobs is around 8-9 per cent. OECD (2010) find an average of a 3 to 4 
percentage point wage premium associated with changing jobs for a range of European countries. 
Their estimate for the Irish wage premium is higher at around 9 per cent.   
The main contribution of the paper is to control for misclassification in job mobility status when 
estimating the impact of job mobility on wage growth. A two-step approach is adopted. The key 
result is that ignoring misclassification leads to a significant downwards bias in the wage impact of 
job mobility and the paper provides an estimate of the wage effect of job mobility, which corrects 
for measurement error.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 examines the reasons for and incidence of reporting 
errors in labour market survey data and, in particular, focuses on studies relevant to job mobility. 
Section 3 describes the dataset and explores the extent of measurement error in the LIS data. 
Section 4 outlines the econometric approach. Section 5 presents some descriptive statistics on job 
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mobility and wage growth. Section 6 presents estimation results and some sensitivity analysis and 
Section 7 concludes.  
2. Reporting Errors in Labour Market Survey Data 
Many empirical studies of job mobility use survey data and usually surveys do not contain a direct 
question asking if the respondent has changed jobs in the past year. Instead job changes are inferred 
from the length of time an employee reports to have been with their current employer. There are 
several reasons to suspect that responses to questions about tenure are measured with error. 
Respondents may find it difficult to remember when they started working in their current job. Bound 
et al. (2001) describe studies that categorise the question and answer process in a survey as a four-
stage procedure. These stages include understanding the question, recovering the information from 
memory, considering whether the information matches what was requested and communicating the 
response.  Much of the measurement error literature focuses on the stage where respondents 
retrieve the information from memory. A general principle from this literature is that the longer the 
length of the recall period the greater the expected bias due to respondent retrieval error. Therefore 
we might expect respondents with longer tenure to be most likely to misreport tenure. In one sense, 
this does not pose a serious problem for calculating job changes as they are associated with people 
who have short tenures; provided those with longer tenures who misreport do not significantly 
underestimate their tenure.  Farber (1999) and Ureta (1992) find a heaping of tenure responses at 
round counts of years or round calendar years and this rounding indicates that individuals do not 
provide precise responses about tenure.  
There may also be ambiguity in the wording of the question about tenure or there may be changes 
to the wording of the question in other waves of a survey. Farber (1999) points to how the mobility 
supplements to the Current Population Survey in the US from 1951 to 1981 asked workers what year 
they “…started working at their present job or business” while in later years the supplement asked 
workers how many years they have “…been working continuously for the present employer”. The 
earlier question refers to time on the present job rather than time with the present employer. 
Workers may experience other types of mobility (e.g. promotion, reassignment) which means that 
their time on the job will be shorter than their time with the employer. The interviewer notes for the 
LIS provide clarity in distinguishing between employer changes and other types of internal mobility 
as they state that the question refers to when they started working with their present employer 
even if there have been position changes with that employer. In addition, there were no changes to 
the wording of the question about tenure in the LIS. The interviewer notes for the LIS do not provide 
guidance on how to handle interrupted employment spells (in particular when someone returns to a 
previous employer). Farber (1999) indicates that if no reference is made to the continuity of 
employment that the natural inclination of workers will be to ignore interruptions of “reasonable” 
length.  
Brown and Light (1992) examine the extent of measurement error in tenure responses in the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). They find that tenure responses are frequently inconsistent with 
calendar time.2 In addition, they perform a validation exercise to gauge the accuracy of their 
measure of job changes. They adopt a range of definitions of job mobility (based on tenure 
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responses) and use them to partition the data into distinct jobs. They assess the accuracy of the 
various measures by comparing the number of jobs and the number of times each job is observed 
with those identified by the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS). The NLS contains unique employer 
codes which can be compared across interviews and so provides a more accurate count of the ‘true’ 
number of jobs.  
Brown and Light (1992) investigate which definition of a job change performs best when there is 
measurement error in tenure data. One definition they employ is to assume that a job change has 
taken place whenever reported tenure is less than the time elapsed since the previous interview. If 
tenure was never misreported and if respondents never returned to previous employers then this 
method would identify job changes without error. They also examine defining a job change to occur 
whenever the change in tenure between adjacent interviews varies “too much” or “too little” in 
either direction. In another definition, a job change is defined whenever the change in tenure is not 
exactly equal to the change in calendar time between interviews. This permits no inconsistency in 
tenure responses within jobs. They also employ more flexible measures that permit various amounts 
of inconsistency in reported tenure within jobs, where the change in tenure differs from the change 
in calendar time by more than 6, 12, 18 and 24 months in either direction.  As these latter definitions 
identify job changes when tenure changes by “too much” as well as by “too little” they are more 
likely to separate continuing jobs but less likely to link jobs that are truly separate than when job 
changes are defined as occurring whenever reported tenure is less than the time elapsed since the 
previous interview. They find the definition of job mobility that is the most accurate when compared 
to the NLS data is that a job change has occurred whenever reported tenure is less than the time 
elapsed between interviews. This is the definition of job change used in this paper. 
These types of validation studies are also useful because they provide evidence on the magnitude of 
measurement error in tenure data. Bound et al. (2001) point out that few studies have investigated 
the quality of tenure data. An example is Duncan and Hill (1985) who present results from a 
validation study of a large manufacturing company in which administrative records are used to 
validate survey responses from workers. Overall they find very little evidence of bias. They find that 
reported tenure is typically quite accurate; 45 per cent of the sample accurately reported the year 
they were hired and 90 per cent were able to report year of hire to within one year. However, the 
unit of analysis is in terms of years and these types of error margins in a dataset could be 
problematic if we were to use the measure of tenure to calculate job changes. As job changes are 
identified from those who report short tenures the under or over reporting of tenure by a year, in 
particular by those with short tenures, could lead us to misclassify job changes and vice versa.  
Weiss et al. (1961) also compare reported starting dates to employer records and find that 71 per 
cent of jobs in the prior 5 years had reported starting dates within one month of company records. 
They also find that validity significantly declines as a function of the length of time between the job 
start date and the date of interview. To capture job mobility, tenure, at least for those who have not 
been in their jobs long, needs to be reported accurately. These validation studies suggest that the 
quality of tenure data may not be sufficient to do this. 
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3. Measurement Error  
3.1 Dataset  
The LIS is the Irish component of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) which began in 
1994 and ended in 2001.3 It involved an annual survey of a representative sample of private 
households and individuals aged 16 years and over and households were followed over time. The 
survey collected a wide range of data such as labour force status, education level, income, job 
attributes and firm characteristics.4 
The panel dimension of the LIS is exploited to identify job changes. A revolving balanced panel of 
people aged 20 to 60 years, roughly the prime working age, is selected for each country. This means 
that individuals are included in the sample in every year that they meet this age restriction. A 
revolving balanced panel is preferable over a balanced panel as a balanced panel prevents the entry 
of younger people into the sample and so, over time, as the fixed sample ages the proportion of 
younger people would decline. Essentially, a revolving balanced panel allows younger people into 
the sample in later years and allows older people to leave the sample. In addition, they must also 
have completed the interview in each year in question. Finally, around 120 cases are deleted from 
the sample each year; these cases refer to where the respondent is working but the start date with 
their employer is missing in any year. 
There is no explicit question in the LIS about whether or not a person has changed jobs; instead job 
transitions are inferred from responses to the question about when they started working with their 
present employer. If a person is employed in two consecutive years and in the second year they 
report a starting date that falls between the two interview dates we conclude that this person has 
changed jobs during that period. Table 1 shows the number of observations in the revolving 
balanced panel, the number of workers employed in consecutive two-year periods and the number 
of job changes each year.  
< Table 1 here >  
However, in the absence of exogenous job change information we cannot be certain that the 
number of job changes reported in Table 1 is correct. Responses to questions about tenure are 
frequently inconsistent. For example, in one interview a person may report that their job spell 
started in January 1995 while the following year they may report that it started in January 1993. The 
concern in this paper is not necessarily that tenure is misreported but rather that if tenure is 
misreported there is a risk that cases may be misclassified as job changes and vice versa. For 
example, suppose a worker is interviewed in January 1995 and January 1996 and in January 1996 
they report a start date in January 1993. Using the measure of job change defined above, we would 
conclude that no job change has taken place between the interviews in 1995 and 1996. However, 
suppose this person cannot accurately recall when the spell started and they misreport their starting 
date to be January 1995. Then we would erroneously conclude that this person has changed jobs 
between their interviews in 1995 and 1996. Now, suppose that their true starting date is January 
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1995 so that they have truly changed jobs between interviews but they misreport their starting date 
to be January 1993. In this case we would erroneously conclude that no job change has taken place 
between interviews. In an attempt to ascertain how reliable the responses to the question about 
when a worker started working with their current employer are the next section examines the 
consistency of these responses over time.  
3.2 Consistency of Starting Dates within Jobs 
Given the possibility of measurement error we need to ascertain how reliable the information on 
starting dates is and therefore how useful it is for deducing job changes. If there were no 
measurement error then starting dates would be constant within jobs. By separating the dataset 
into distinct jobs and comparing starting dates across interviews we can investigate how consistent 
the data is.  
Beginning with the 1995 data, there are 1,163 workers but as 76 workers changed jobs a total of 
1,239 distinct jobs are observable (see Table 1). For this year, the previous jobs of those who 
changed jobs are excluded from the analysis as we only have one observation on their previous jobs 
(the starting date in 1994) so we cannot check the consistency of responses whereas we can track 
the new jobs across following interviews. We start with 1,163 distinct jobs in 1995. In each 
subsequent year one of four alternatives occurs:  
1) A worker can stay in their job so the total number of jobs remains the same and the job 
survives an additional year. 
2) A worker can drop out of the sample if they become unemployed, leave the labour force for 
more than a year or are over the age of 60.Here the total number of jobs remains the same 
and we no longer observe that particular job.  
3) A worker can change jobs and accordingly the total number of jobs increases by one. 
4) There can be a new entrant to the sample. This could be someone from the revolving 
balanced panel who is now 20 and so was excluded in earlier years or a worker who was 
unemployed or out of the labour force may come back into the analysis and this would 
increase the total number of jobs observed by one.  
This results in 2,529 jobs observable for various durations over the period 1995 to 2001. Of these, 
there are 1,755 jobs observable for more than one year and this set of jobs is considered in the 
analysis in this section (so there are at least two starting dates to compare for each job). Table 2 
shows how many jobs display consistency in starting dates. Of the 1,755 jobs considered, only 352 or 
20 per cent have the same reported starting date each year the job is observed. If we adopt a less 
stringent definition of consistency such as all starting dates being within 3 months of each other 
then 37 per cent of jobs meet the criterion. If we relax the criterion further to where all starting 
dates are within 6 months of each other then 42 per cent of jobs display consistent responses. This 
leaves 1,014 or 58 per cent of jobs that survive for more than one year where all starting dates do 
not fall within 6 months of each other. 
< Table 2 here >  
This level of inconsistency in starting dates is quite alarming; however, it is in line with what has 
been found in other datasets. Brown and Light (1992) take a sample from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) from 1976 to 1985 and partition the data into distinct jobs in an analogous fashion. 
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They find that only 7 per cent of jobs have identical starting dates in each year the job is observed, 
while 54 per cent of jobs have starting dates that do not all fall within 6 months of each other.  
Brown and Light (1992) highlight another aspect of this definition of consistency that may be quite 
restrictive. Suppose a job is observed in every year of the survey and every reported starting date  is 
equal with the exception of one which is different to the others by 7 months, then this job will not 
meet any of the measures of consistency define above. They argue most researchers would agree 
that this outlier could be ‘fixed’ to match up to the other observations for that job. Therefore, the 
measure of consistency used in Table 2 can be extended by requiring that only a majority of starting 
dates for jobs be in agreement.   
Table 3 shows how many jobs have a majority of starting dates in agreement. A total of 654 jobs or 
37 per cent have a majority of starting dates in agreement, while 84 per cent of all jobs identified 
have a majority of starting dates that are within 3 months of each other.  The bottom panel of the 
table reports comparable statistics for the PSID taken from Brown and Light (1992). As before, the 
magnitudes of the consistency measures are broadly comparable with the Irish data. Given that both 
datasets display similar discrepancies, it is likely that any study using a similar question to deduce job 
changes contains measurement error. 
<Table 3 here> 
The method for dividing the dataset into separate jobs uses job changes to identify when one job 
ends and another one begins. The analysis in this section implies that the measure of job change 
may not accurately identify the true number of job changes i.e. there are probably cases identified 
as job changes when no change in jobs took place and vice versa. This means we may over or 
underestimate the true number of jobs and therefore the level of inconsistent starting dates within 
jobs.  
Tables 2 and 3 focus on the extent and magnitude of inconsistencies evident in the data and it is 
clear that there is the possibility of substantial measurement error. In this paper, the main concern 
about measurement error is not directly that starting dates are misreported but rather that the 
misreporting of starting dates may cause cases to be misclassified as job changes and vice versa.  
There are cases where it is very unlikely a job change has taken place, even though there are 
inconsistencies in starting dates, such as if the reported starting dates are sufficiently long ago. Of 
particular concern are inconsistencies in jobs where reported tenure is low. For example, suppose 
we observe a job every year between 1995 and 2001; it is more likely that this person has changed 
jobs at some point over this period and it has not been captured if the inconsistency in starting dates 
falls close to or within that period. However, if all inconsistencies in reported starting dates refer to a 
time period sufficiently far back then it is more likely that this person hasn’t changed jobs recently 
and just cannot accurately recall when they started working in their current job.  
Table 4 examines the timing of inconsistencies in reported starting dates within jobs. It reports how 
many of these jobs have the dates of all inconsistencies occurring at least three years prior to the 
date that we first start observing the job.5 There are 722 jobs where all discrepancies fall reasonably 
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far in the past so that these are probably truly continuing jobs. However, there are 681 jobs where 
the reported inconsistencies are more recent and it is more likely in these cases that we have linked 
jobs that are distinct or divided continuing jobs.  
 <Table 4 here> 
This section focussed on examining discrepancies in reported starting dates within jobs. In the 
remainder of the paper, the focus is on how measurement error may lead us to misclassify a worker 
in a given year as being a job changer and vice versa so the unit of analysis switches from jobs to 
workers.  
4. Econometric Approach 
This section begins by discussing the Hausman et al. (1998) estimator to control for misclassification 
in the dependent variable in a discrete response model. A discrete choice model can be used to 
examine the decision to change jobs. Given the level of inconsistencies in the data, it is likely that 
incorrect inferences have been made about whether or not a worker has changed jobs so it is 
essential to control for misclassification. Measurement error in a binary variable results in 
misclassification i.e. some observations are misclassified as a zero when the variable is actually a 
one, and vice versa. In a linear regression model measurement error in the dependent variable only 
affects the precision of coefficient estimates; however the same problem leads to estimates that are 
biased and inconsistent in a nonlinear model.6 Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998) use 
Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate that even small amounts of misclassification can lead to 
substantially biased parameter estimates in a probit model. Then Section 4.2 investigates the 
relationship between job mobility and wage growth and how it is affected by misclassification so 
here the mismeasured binary variable is an explanatory variable.  The econometric problems 
associated with estimating the impact of job mobility on wage growth, namely unobserved 
heterogeneity, possible two-way causation between job mobility and wage growth and 
measurement error in capturing job changes are also outlined. Section 4.3 describes the two-step 
empirical strategy used to deal with misclassification in a binary explanatory variable when 
estimating the impact of job mobility on wage growth. 
4.1 Binary Choice Model with Misclassification 
Hausman et al. (1988) develop a maximum likelihood estimator to control for misclassification in 
discrete dependent variables that consistently estimates the coefficients of a model and also the 
extent of misclassification. The decision to change jobs can be set in the usual latent-variable 
specification of the binary choice model.7 
Let    
  be a continuous unobservable latent variable that represents the potential for a worker to 
change jobs:  
 
 
    
      where i=1, 2….n                       (1) 
 
and    is an independently and identically distributed error term. We cannot observe   
  ; instead we 
observe whether a worker changes jobs or not so for each worker there is a threshold level,   
 , at or 
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above which they change jobs otherwise they stay in their job. The true response (or what we would 
observe if there was no measurement error),    , is given by: 
      if    
    
                                                    (2) 
          otherwise 
 
However the classification of workers as having changed jobs or not is observed with error so let    
denote observed job changes. Two types of misclassification can occur, so let the probability that a 
job stay is misclassified as a job change be given by    and the probability that a job change is 
misclassified as a job stay be given by   . These probabilities depend on the true value,    , so the 
extent of misclassification depends on how good a proxy    is of    . The misclassification 
probabilities are assumed to be independent of the covariates,   , conditional on the true response, 
more formally: 8 
                                    (3) 
                                    (4) 
 
Let F(.) denote the cdf of   . The probability that an observation is truly a job change is given by: 
                  
             
                     (5) 
 
The probability that an observation is classified as being equal to one                is given by 
the probability that it has been correctly classified as being equal to one         multiplied by the 
probability that it is truly equal to one      
     plus the probability that it has been incorrectly 
classified as being equal to one      multiplied by the probability that it truly is not equal to one 
       
     as follows:  
                      
             
                     
    (6) 
The expected value of the observed dependent variable    is given by: 
                                     
    (7) 
 
When there is no misclassification          , this collapses to usual expression     
   . 
Assuming    are normally distributed, the log-likelihood function for the probit model with 
misclassification is: 
                                               
 
   
 
 (8) 
                          
                                
     
 
   
 
    where     denotes the cdf of the normal distribution  
Maximising the log-likelihood function given in (8) with respect to        and   yields consistent and 
efficient estimates of   as well as the probabilities of misclassification.  
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The conditions for identification of       and   are similar to those for the traditional binary choice 
model. One additional assumption is needed, namely that the misclassification probabilities are not 
very large, specifically,        .
9 When this assumption is not imposed the estimator cannot 
distinguish between the parameter values           and               . Imposing this 
assumption excludes this situation because         implies                . This 
implies that if          but we impose          the estimates of    will have the wrong 
sign. The assumption guarantees that                 
    is strictly increasing in   
   as      
is strictly increasing.   
The model parameters are identified from the nonlinearity of    . Estimating    and    is only 
possible because they enter (8) additively. This can be demonstrated by taking limits of          as 
  
    tends to   and   in (7). 
   
  
      
                    
  
      
                   (9) 
The identification of the misclassification probabilities comes from cases where              is 
close to 0 and 1 i.e. where   
    is big in magnitude. The misclassification rates are assumed to be 
constant and depend only on the true value,    , so the probability of misclassifying a job stay,   , is 
identified from cases that have extremely negative characteristics in terms of job mobility and so are 
very unlikely to truly be job changes. However, as some constant proportion,   , are misclassified as 
job changes,             does not drop below    no matter how negative   
    is. In a similar 
fashion, the probability of misclassifying a job change as a job stay,   , is estimated from cases 
where   
    is very large and positive and so these cases have a very high probability of truly being 
job changes but some proportion are misclassified. Therefore             will not rise above   
  . 
This estimator, or variants and extension of it, have been used in a wide range of empirical 
applications where researchers suspect there is measurement error in a discrete variable. For 
example, Artís et al. (2002) investigate insurance fraud, Brachet (2008) and Kenkel et al. examine 
smoking data, Caudill and Mixon (2005) are interested in undergraduate student cheating, 
Dustmann and Van Soest (2001, 2004) examine language indicators, Flathmann and Sheffrin (2003) 
investigate self-reported non-compliance in completing tax returns and Jensen et al. (2011) examine 
patent applications.  
4.2 Econometric Issues 
The standard model for estimating the impact of changing jobs on wage growth is: 
              
           (10) 
 
where    is the natural logarithm of the wage of individual i at time t,   
  is a dummy variable 
indicating whether a job change has taken place between t-1 and t,     is a vector of personal, job 
and firm characteristics and     is a random component that is mean zero and is uncorrelated with 
   
   and    . The key parameter of interest,  , captures the average percent difference in wage 
growth between job changers and job stayers adjusted for worker and job characteristics. Pooled 
OLS estimation of (10) is likely to produce biased estimates because of: (1) unobserved 
                                                          
9
 Hausman et al. (1998) refer to this as the ‘monotonicity condition’. 
11 
 
heterogeneity, (2) the endogeneity of job mobility and (3) measurement error in capturing job 
changes. The first two issues have been tackled in the literature and the main contribution of the 
paper is to control for measurement error in job mobility when estimating its impact on wage 
growth.  
Unobserved Heterogeneity 
There may be unobserved factors that affect both wage growth and the decision to change jobs that 
can cause bias in the estimates. Intuitively, we want to compare the wage growth of a job changer 
with what they would have received had they stayed in their job. The estimate of   from (10) is 
unlikely to provide an accurate measure of this effect, if the average wage growth of stayers does 
not reflect the average wage growth job changers would have received had they stayed in their jobs.  
For example, in the mover-stayer model of Blumen et al. (1955), stayers experience higher wage 
growth than changers because they have some underlying personal characteristic that makes them 
more likely to stay in their job which also makes them more productive, which leads to higher wage 
growth.  Therefore, the mover-stayer model suggests the estimate of   from (10) may be biased 
downwards.  
Several techniques are used in the empirical literature to overcome this problem. One approach 
suggested by Bartel and Borjas (1981) and developed by Mincer (1986) is to use a proxy for the wage 
growth changers would have obtained had they not changed jobs. Mincer uses wage growth of 
those who do not change jobs in the current period but who change jobs in the following period as 
the proxy. The returns to mobility are then measured as the difference between the wage growth of 
workers who change jobs in the current period and the wage growth of workers who do not change 
jobs in the current period but do change jobs in the following period. This approach has been used 
by Abbott and Beach (1994), Campbell (2001) and Keith and McWilliams (1999). The key assumption 
is that workers who stay in their job in the initial period and who change jobs in the subsequent 
period are more similar, in terms of unobservable characteristics, to those who change jobs in the 
initial period than workers who stay in their jobs in both periods.  
More recently, because of the availability of panel data, the issue of unobserved heterogeneity has 
been dealt with in a fixed effects estimation framework: 
              
           (11) 
where              
 
The error component has two distinct parts:    captures unobservable individual-specific effects that 
can vary across individuals but are constant over time for each individual and     is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the observed and unobserved characteristics across individuals and time.10,11  
Unobserved heterogeneity is usually handled using a fixed effects or random effects model. The 
fixed effects model allows    to be correlated with other regressors. The estimator transforms all 
variables to deviations from their sample means for all time periods, so    drops out of the equation 
because it is constant over time. This framework has been used by Davia (2005), Le Grand and Tahlin 
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(2002), Light and McGarry (1998), Naticchiono and Panigo (2004), Munasinghe and Sigman (2004) 
and Pavlopoulos et al. (2007). The key difference between the fixed and random effects models is 
that the random effects model assumes that the    are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the 
model; a quite restrictive assumption.  Section 6 reports results from tests for individual effects  and 
tests that discriminate between fixed and random effects models. 
Reverse Causality 
One source of endogeneity in (10) is two-way causation; not only is wage growth affected by job 
mobility but job changes may occur in anticipation of higher wage growth. If this feedback occurs 
from wages to job mobility then   
  will be correlated with     in (11) as   
  depends on           
which directly depends on    . While it is reasonable to assume that there is no contemporaneous 
correlation between job mobility and the error term, the error term and future job changes may be 
correlated if workers decide to change jobs in the future based on shocks to wage growth in the 
past. In this case, the assumption of strict exogeneity underlying the random effects and fixed 
effects estimators (conditional on the unobserved individual effect in the case of fixed effects) can 
fail.  Generally, random effects and fixed effects will be inconsistent if job mobility in some time 
period is correlated with    . (Note, pooled OLS does not require all explanatory variables to be 
strictly exogeneous.)  
One approach in applied work to deal with this problem is to use an instrument for mobility status. 
Possible instruments suggested in the literature include housing tenure status, job satisfaction (in 
particular the components of job satisfaction that do not refer to satisfaction with wages) and 
dummies for the region in which a person lives. Davia (2005) uses the predicted probabilities from a 
probit model of job change as an instrument for job mobility.  
Misclassification  
Measurement Error in Binary Regressors 
Another source of potential bias in (10) is misclassification of job changes which can result in 
attenuation bias. Define    to be a noisy indicator of the binary variable   
 . Then we can write the 
observed value,   , as the sum of the true value,   
 , plus a measurement error,    : 
       
      (12) 
 
where     is mean zero. When   
   ,    can only take on two values; 1 if it is correctly classified 
so      , or      so       . When   
   ,    can never overestimate/over-report the 
true value. Likewise, when   
   ,     can never underestimate the true value;      is either 0 or 
+1. Therefore the measurement error is negatively correlated with the true variable so 
misclassification in a dummy variable leads to non-classical measurement error. 
Aigner (1973) and others have shown that when a binary regressor is misclassified the least squares 
coefficient estimates are biased towards zero and that additional assumptions or knowledge about 
the extent of misclassification in the data is needed to correct the estimates. To illustrate this, 
consider the model given in (10) where   
  denotes true job changes. Suppose we do not observe 
   
  but we observe    (as defined in (12)), which misclassifies some of the observations. Similar to 
section 4.1, let     denote the probability that a true job stay is misclassified as a job change i.e. 
               
                 
     and    denote the probability that a job change 
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is misclassified as a job stay i.e.                
                  
    .12 Let   
denote the mean of   
 . Since   
  is a binary variable,   corresponds to the probability of truly 
changing jobs; the probability that   
  is equal to 1. It follows that                   
       . In what follows, let                             for simplicity. 
First, consider a model with a single binary regressor: 
              
      (13) 
 
However, we cannot observe   
  only the mismeasured proxy   , from (12), so: 
                         
                                        (14) 
 
Using    as a proxy for   
  means the measurement error becomes part of the error term in (14) 
and therefore creates an endogeneity bias. Estimating (14) yields an OLS estimator for   with a 
probability limit: 
            
 
          
     
                     
 
          
     
    (15) 
    
where    is the attenuation coefficient in a model with a single misclassified regressor. As   ,   ,   
and   are all greater than zero but less than one and    , the attenuation coefficient    given in 
(15) is less than one which implies that the OLS estimate of   is biased towards zero. Without 
knowledge about the misclassification rates,    and   , and the probability that an observation is 
truly a job change,  , we cannot identify the true    from our data. Furthermore, for very high levels 
of misclassification the expression for    could be negative yielding an OLS estimate of the wrong 
sign (Kane, Rouse and Staiger (1999)). 
Attenuation bias is typically exacerbated in multivariate regression (Angrist and Krueger (1999)). 
Card (1996) and others have shown that the attenuation factor in this case is given by:  
  
                 
    
 (16) 
      
where    is the attenuation factor from the model with no other covariates, from (15), and    is the 
theoretical    from a regression of observed job changes on the other explanatory variables in the 
model. 
Misclassification will cause both OLS and fixed effects estimates to be biased towards zero and 
inconsistent. However, the bias is likely to be amplified in the fixed-effects estimates (Bound et al. 
(2001)). Correctly measured explanatory variables tend to be correlated across time so there is 
typically much less within-group variation in these variables than in the measurement error (as this 
will tend to exhibit weak or no serial correlation). Therefore, misclassification in fixed effects models 
                                                          
12
 As before, this assumes that the misclassification rates are constant across individuals and time and that 
they only depend on the true value   
  and not on the other covariates in the model. 
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tends to reduce the variance in the signal relative to the variance in the noise so attenuation bias in 
this model can be more severe than both measurement error bias and heterogeneity bias in a 
pooled OLS model. 
Implications for Instrumental Variable Estimation 
With a misclassified binary regressor, conventional instrumental variable estimation does not yield a 
consistent estimate of  . A valid instrument must be correlated with the true value,   
  , and 
uncorrelated with the error term which is made up of the random error     and the misclassification 
error    . As     is correlated with   
 , any variable (potential instrument) which is correlated with 
   
  will also generally be correlated with the measurement error. If an instrument is available, IV 
estimation will remove the correlation between   
  and     but not between   
  and     and so the 
IV estimate of   will be biased. 
In a case with a single binary (misclassified) explanatory variable the IV estimate of   is biased by a 
factor             (see Angrist and Krueger (1999), Kane, Rouse and Staiger (1999)). As 
        and generally        , the IV estimate will be biased upwards. In a bivariate 
regression with a mismeasured binary explanatory variable the OLS estimate is biased downwards 
and the IV estimate is biased upwards so these estimates can be used to bound the true coefficient. 
Approaches in the Literature 
There are several approaches to dealing with measurement error in binary regressors. One is to 
exploit external estimates of misclassification rates as might be available from validation surveys. For 
example, Freeman (1984) and Card (1996) examine the impact of union membership on wages using 
a validation survey that has both employer and worker reports of union status to estimate the 
misclassification rates in the reporting of union status. Kane, Rouse and Staiger (1999) adopt develop 
a generalised method of moments estimator to obtain consistent estimates when there are two 
noisy reports of the regressor.  Another approach assumes additional sample information can be 
used.  For example, Mahajan (2006) assumes that additional information, in the form of a second 
variable, is available that is correlated with the unobserved true variable but not related to the 
misclassification in the binary variable and shows how this can be used to identify and estimate a 
nonlinear model with a misclassified binary regressor. 
Other authors derive bounds for the estimates. Bollinger (1996, 2001) establishes bounds for the 
true coefficients in a linear regression when a binary regressor is mismeasured. Bollinger also shows 
how these bounds can be made tighter if information about the misclassification rates is available. 
Frazis and Loewenstein (2003) extend the Hausman et al. (1998) estimator and compute bounds for 
the misclassification rates without making functional form assumptions. They combine these bounds 
with the OLS coefficient to bound the true effect of the mismeasured explanatory variable.  
Card (1996) and Frazis and Loewenstein (2003) provide an expression for the inconsistency in OLS 
estimates due to misclassification, assuming the other explanatory variables in the model are 
correctly measured: 
              
                   
  
                       




A sensitivity analysis is performed Section 6 that uses this expression to provide “corrected” OLS 
estimates of the impact of job mobility on wage growth. 
4.3 Empirical Strategy 
A two-step approach to controlling for misclassification in estimating the effect of job mobility on 
wage growth is adopted. It follows Brachet (2008) and is similar to Dustman and van Soest (2001). 
The first step uses the Hausman et al. (1998) estimator to generates consistent estimates of the 
coefficients from a model of job change including the misclassification probabilities and, most 
importantly for this paper, the probability of truly being a job changer,        
     .  This yields a 
proxy for   
   that removes the impact of misclassification. In the second step,  (10) is estimated 
using pooled OLS substituting in for   
   using the fitted probabilities that an observation is truly a 
job change calculated in the first stage. The coefficient estimates will be consistent provided the 
functional form for F(.) in the first step has been correctly specified.13 
The same approach is used to control for both measurement error in job changes and unobserved 
heterogeneity; the wage growth equation in the second step is estimated using a fixed effects or a 
random effects estimator. In addition, if we have an instrument for job mobility, it can be used in the 
first stage of the procedure to create a proxy for   
   that removes both the impact of 
misclassification and the correlation with the error term. It is hard to find good instruments for job 
mobility. The paper attempts to control for reverse causality using non-wage elements of job 
satisfaction as instruments for job mobility.  
5. Descriptive Statistics 
The starting point is the sample of workers described in Section 3.1.14 Two additional restrictions are 
placed on the sample: (1) only income from paid employment is considered so self-employed 
workers and farmers are excluded and (2) workers are excluded in any year that they report they are 
working part-time (less than 30 hours).15, 16 These restrictions ensure some degree of homogeneity in 
the sample. The dependent variable is the change in log real gross hourly wages between period t-1 
and t. In each year, there are around 90 cases where wage data are not available and these person-
year observations are dropped. The final sample consists of 1,206 workers and 5,346 person-year 
observations, observable for various durations over the period 1995 to 2001. 
Table 5 provides preliminary evidence of the relationship between wage growth and job mobility. It 
shows that annual average wage growth for all workers is 8.5 per cent. The next two rows of the 
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 See Brachet (2008) for proof. 
14
 The focus of this paper is on job-to-job transitions. The sample restrictions and definition of job mobility 
used means that workers cannot be unemployed or leave the labour force for any considerable amount of 
time between jobs (specifically by more than the amount of time between interviews). Therefore, the sample 
is probably a length time biased sample of job changers; in the sense that it may over-represent those who 
experience a relatively short period of unemployment between jobs or who leave the labour force for a 
relatively short period between jobs and under-represent those who are unemployed or leave the labour force 
for longer durations between jobs. 
15
 This means that part-time workers are included in the sample in other waves if they are working full-time; 
however the results presented in the next section are similar to those when part-time workers are deleted 
entirely from the sample. 
16 Another reason for focussing on full-time workers is the possibility of measurement error in reported usual 
hours worked. Baum-Snow and Neal (2009) show that there is substantial measurement error in hourly wages 
for part-time workers. 
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table divides workers into job ‘movers’ and ‘stayers’, where job movers are those who change jobs 
at some point over the period 1995 to 2001 and stayers are those who are observed in the same job 
over the entire period. Job movers experience higher but more variable wage growth than those 
who stay in their jobs. An examination of real wage growth at different points in the distributions for 
job movers and stayers reveal that they are closest at the 25th percentile; however at the median 
and 75th percentiles wage growth of job changers is over 1.5 times that of job movers.  
It may also be important to distinguish between different types of mobility when looking at wage 
effects associated with changing jobs.17 Voluntary movers experience higher wage growth than 
involuntary movers and stayers, as expected. However involuntary movers record higher wage 
growth than job stayers which is surprising. The previous empirical literature has shown that 
involuntary job movers can experience wage losses, not just at the time of job change but that these 
losses can be permanent, especially if there is a period of unemployment between jobs (e.g. Garcia 
Perez and Rebollo Sanz (2005)). This effect is not evident in Table 5. This may be due to the fact that 
the sample is one where workers have a very high attachment to the labour force; workers need to 
be employed in consecutive two-year periods to be included in the sample. In addition, the time 
period under consideration is one of exceptional economic and employment growth in Ireland so it 
is possible that any reputation effects related to involuntary mobility may be reduced and/or job 
search costs may be lower as jobs are more plentiful.  
The table also shows average wage growth for workers that move once and for workers that move 
more than once. Here, we do not distinguish between the types of move a worker may make, rather 
the number of moves. Workers who change jobs more than once experience higher wage growth 
than those who only move once. There do not appear to be any reputation effects associated with 
repeated mobiliy.18 
<Table 5 here> 
Controlling for the timing of job changes helps to disentangle whether the higher wage growth of job 
movers described in Table 5 is attributable to a discrete jump in wages at the time of starting a new 
job or if changing jobs shifts a worker onto a higher wage growth profile. Table 6 shows the annual 
average wage growth for job ‘moves’ and job ‘stays’. The unit of analysis has shifted from people in 
Table 5 to person-year observations. There are very large and variable wage gains related to job 
moves; a job move is associated with an average wage increase of around 17 per cent, compared to 
an average wage increase of around 6 per cent for a job stay. Comparing these figures with those 
from Table 5 implies that the bulk of the wage increase associated with job mobility happens at the 
time of changing jobs. The table also shows that wage growth is greatest for voluntary moves and 
that involuntary moves are associated with wage gains higher than those of job stays. Wage growth 
does not differ much depending on the whether it is the first move that we observe a worker making 
over the period or their second or third move etc over the period. 
<Table 6 here> 
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 Other movers are those who do not state a reason for their job separation or who experience different types 
of mobility (e.g. they experience both a voluntary and an involuntary quit). 
18
 Of course, we observe people at different stages in their working lives and the analysis cannot control for 




This section presents econometric estimates of the effect of changing jobs on wage growth. It begins 
with pooled OLS results, which give an idea of the initial correlation between job mobility and wage 
growth. It then controls for unobserved heterogeneity and investigates whether there are 
differential wage impacts depending on the type of mobility. Then the results for controlling for 
misclassification in job changes are presented. A sensitivity analysis illustrates the effect 
misclassification has on the estimated wage effect associated with job mobility. Finally, an attempt is 
made to control for the bias due to the reverse causality between job mobility and wages. 
Table 7 shows the pooled OLS estimates. The first specification contains no additional regressors 
(other than a constant term). The coefficient estimate on the job change dummy implies that the 
average increase in wage growth associated with changing jobs is around 10½ per cent and this 
effect is highly significant.  
The second model includes the standard set of control variables that determine wage growth.19 It 
includes traditional human capital variables such as age, experience and level of education. In 
addition, some job characteristics are controlled for, such as whether the job is in the public or 
private sector, firm size etc. Year dummies are included to control for changes in the 
macroeconomic environment. The estimate on the job change dummy variable is around 8 per cent 
indicating that some (around 2½ percentage points) of the higher wage growth associated with 
changing jobs is attributable to differences in observed characteristics.  
The results show that wage growth declines with age and experience. This may reflect the fact that 
investment in human capital declines over the life-cycle. As expected, wage growth is higher for 
those who have at least a third level degree. The results reveal no significant difference between 
male and female, and public and private sector wage growth once differences in observable 
characteristics are controlled for. Workers in larger firms are expected to have higher wage growth, 
as larger firms are more likely to have internal labour markets etc, but the estimated effect is 
negative. Workers in sectors that are more exposed to market forces and where competitiveness is 
more important for growth, such as the manufacturing sector, have lower estimated wage changes. 
Working in the construction sector has a positive effect on wage growth, probably reflecting the fact 
that the sector was booming during the period. However, none of the sectoral wage effects are 
significant.  
Next, unmeasured individual characteristics are controlled for using fixed effects and random effects 
models.20 The key point to note about the estimation results is that mobility has a strong, positive 
and significant effect on wage growth even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Overall, 
                                                          
19
 The explanatory variables are lagged by one year, so for job changers they refer to their characteristics in 
their previous jobs.  
20
 The fixed effects model excludes time dummies as variables like age, and to some extent experience, change 
within individuals in the same way over time so the effect of a variable like age in a fixed effects model is 
interpretable more as a linear time trend. In addition, the estimate of job change on wage growth when age 
and experience are excluded and time dummies are included is practically identical. The education variables 
are also excluded as they have little within-person variation and reported changes in education level may 
reflect measurement error. 
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the fixed effects estimates are broadly comparable to the OLS estimates.21 The estimates indicate 
that the impact of changing jobs on wage growth is around 11 per cent and the estimate is highly 
significant. This compares with the 8 per cent pooled OLS estimate and is consistent with the 
unobservable characteristic being negatively correlated with job mobility (and so the OLS estimate 
may be biased downwards).  However, an F-test for the individual effects does not reject the null 
hypothesis that the individual effects are not jointly significantly different from zero.22 This goes 
against the prediction of the mover-stayer model. The effects of the other variables included in the 
model are broadly comparable to the estimates from the pooled OLS model. 
The random effects estimates are similar to the pooled OLS ones.  A Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier test helps to discriminate between a random effects and pooled OLS model. The test 
indicates that we reject the null hypothesis that the variances across individuals are zero and this 
indicates that the random effects model is the preferred model. We might expect unobserved 
effects to be correlated with the explanatory variables i.e. that a fixed effects model is appropriate. 
A Hausman test can help decide between a fixed effects and random effects model. The Hausman 
test follows a chi-squared distribution and is equal to 22.47 with a corresponding p-value of 0.0962. 
This suggests we cannot reject the random effects model at the 5 per cent level of significance, but it 
can be rejected at the 10 per cent level of significance.23  
<Table 7 here> 
We expect to see differential wage impacts depending on the reason for job separation. Table 8 
reports the random effects estimates of different types of mobility on wage growth.24, 25 The first 
specification does not distinguish between different types of mobility. Model 2 distinguishes 
between voluntary, involuntary and other types of job changes.26 Voluntary moves have the highest 
effect on wage growth, as expected; they are associated with a 14 per cent increase in short-term 
wage growth and this effect is significant at the 1 per cent level.  Involuntary moves do not have a 
negative impact on wage growth; in fact the estimated effect is positive, although it is insignificant 
and much smaller than for voluntary moves. Although the sign of estimate is not as expected it is not 
significant and, as discussed before, may be attributable to the construction of the sample. In 
addition, it could reflect the tightness in the Irish labour market over the period under consideration 
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 As with the pooled OLS model the standard errors in the fixed effects model are clustered at the individual 
level. Fixed effects account for the time-constant part of the unobservable differences across people. 
However, it may be the case that unobserved random shocks that influence an individual at time t may also 
affect their behaviour at time t+1 therefore leading to correlated errors within people. 
22
 The F-test for the individual effects is calculated from a regression that does not use clustered standard 
errors because the test is based on the assumption of serially uncorrelated errors. 
23 The Hausman test is essentially testing whether the coefficient estimates from the fixed effects model are 
equal to those from the random effects model. As the fixed effects estimator only uses a small part of the 
information in the sample it usually has a large standard error. In practice, the Hausman test can very often 
accept the null hypothesis. Accepting the null hypothesis implies that either the two sets of coefficient 
estimates are reasonably close or it could indicate that the fixed effect estimates have very large standard 
errors and so we fail to reject the null hypothesis (Wooldridge (2002)). 
24
 The same tests were conducted to help choose between the pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects 
specifications. The random effects model is the preferred specification although the estimates from the three 
models are comparable.  
25
 The models only include the relevant job change variable(s) and a constant term. 
26
 Other types of job changes are those where the reason for changing jobs is not reported or the respondent 
chooses the ‘other’ category from a list of possible reasons for changing jobs. 
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where workers had many alternative employment opportunities. The estimated effect of ‘other’ 
types of mobility on wage growth is between the estimates of voluntary and involuntary mobility. 
Model 3 distinguishes between whether this is the first move a worker makes or whether they are 
observed changing jobs more than once during the observation window. The estimate connected 
with the job change being the first move observed is above that of a second or higher move but 
there is no evidence of wage penalties associated with repeated mobility. However, as mentioned 
before, it is important to note that in many cases we do not observe a workers’ entire prior mobility 
history.  
<Table 8 here> 
Next we formally examine the impact of misclassification in job changes on the wage effects 
associated with job mobility using the two-step procedure described in Section 4.3. The first step 
uses the Hausman et al. estimator to control for misclassification in a model of job change.27 Table 9 
shows the marginal effects from a standard probit regression of the probability of job change and 
the Hausman et al. estimates that control for misclassification, with the later estimates used in the 
first stage of estimating the impact of job change on wage growth.28 The table also shows the 
estimates of the misclassification probabilities. The estimated probability of misclassification for job 
stays,   , is very small at a ¼  of one per cent and the estimated probability of misclassification for 
job changes,   , is high at 51 per cent.  Significance tests on    and    can be used as tests of 
misclassification. Workers who have truly changed jobs are more likely to be misclassified, as    
exceeds   . This means that the measure of job change is likely to undercount the true number of 
job changes. To put this estimate    in context, the average mobility rate in the sample used is 
around 8 per cent and this estimate for    implies that the true mobility rate is around 12 per cent. 
Hausman et al. also apply the estimator to a model of job change using US data from the January 
1987 Current Population Survey from the Census Bureau. Their study provides external estimates of 
the misclassification probabilities. They estimate    to be 6.1 per cent and    to be 30.9 per cent.  
Looking across the estimates from the misclassification and probit models, it is evident that when we 
allow for misclassification, the estimated coefficients have higher standard errors implying that 
errors in responses lead to a loss in estimation efficiency. The results also indicate that ignoring 
misclassification leads to diminished covariate effects.  
Although both models indicate that the same factors determine job mobility the effect of 
misclassification in the dependent variable on the marginal effects of the various explanatory 
variables is sizeable. In the theoretical literature on job mobility, years of labour market experience 
is a key determinant of job change. Workers with less labour market experience are more likely to 
changes jobs as they have less knowledge of the labour market and their own preferences and 
abilities for different jobs. Both models provide findings that are consistent with this. However, in 
the probit model, an additional year of experience reduces the probability of changing jobs by 0.9 
percentage points, while the marginal effect in the misclassification model is almost four times 
larger.  
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 The analysis only examines controlling for misclassification in the overall job change dummy variable.  
28
 A series of models were run where the misclassification rates were allowed to depend separately on each of 




The models contain a range of individual controls that include household structure and personal 
characteristics. We may expect women to be more likely to change jobs as they have a weaker 
attachment to the labour force but the results do not indicate any significant gender difference in 
the probability of changing jobs.  The marginal effect of having children is small and insignificant 
implying that the presence of children does not affect the probability of changing jobs. Workers may 
be less likely to change jobs if they are more constrained by non-market variables, such as being 
married or living in a couple but no significant effect is found.  
The results also indicate that the negative effect of human capital on the probability of changing jobs 
is more marked in the misclassification model. For example, general human capital is proxied by 
education level and in the model incorporating misclassification the marginal effect of third level 
education is more than two times higher than in the probit model, although the effect is not 
significant. In addition, the marginal effects of higher levels of occupational attainment relative to 
those in elementary occupations are higher in the misclassification model. For example, the marginal 
effect indicates that those in a managerial occupation are almost 10 per cent less likely to change 
jobs than those who are in elementary occupations versus 4 per cent in the probit model. The results 
also show that workers who have undergone recent training are more likely to change jobs. This may 
reflect the fact that, typically, training is undertaken at the beginning of a job and there is a high 
hazard of new jobs ending early. 
The job mobility models also contain variables that try to capture some job and firm characteristics. 
A variable to capture overskilling is included as it may signify a poor job match. A positive 
relationship between being overskilled and job mobility is found and the effect from the 
misclassification model of being overskilled is twice the impact from the probit model. A firm size 
effect is included to capture the fact that those working in a large firm may have more alternative 
employment opportunities within the firm and so are less likely to change jobs. The results indicate 
that workers in firms with more than 50 employees have a lower probability of changing jobs and, as 
before, the impact is more marked in the misclassification model.  
Working in the public sector is found to exert a negative effect on the probability of changing jobs 
and the marginal impact from the misclassification model is more than twice the impact than in the 
probit model. The effect of the sector a worker was in the previous year (or for job changers the 
sector they previously worked in) is similar in both models but again the marginal effects are higher 
in the misclassification model. The results also show that workers in the construction and market 
services sector are more likely to change jobs than those in the nonmarket services sector.  
The unemployment rate is included to control for factors such as access to alternative jobs and local 
labour market conditions. We expect the impact on the unemployment rate to be negative as a 
lower unemployment rate may signal to workers that jobs are more abundant and that job search is 
likely to result in them finding an alternative job. The impact of the unemployment rate is negative, 
as expected, but only insignificant in the probit model. It is likely that the unemployment rate 
variable is correlated with the time dummy variables. In fact, when the year dummies are dropped 
the effect of the unemployment rate is highly significant. 
One way to demonstrate the differences between the two models is to graph the marginal effects of 
the variables. Figure 1 plots the marginal effect of experience from both models. The curves slope 
down as the probability of job change decreases as years of experience increases. The slopes of the 
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curves are steep at lower values of experience and then flatten out at higher years of experience 
indicating that an additional year of experience reduces the probability of changing jobs but at a 
declining. Overall, the graph shows that the effect of ignoring misclassification error is large, 
especially at low values of experience.  
<Figure 1 here> 
The estimates from the misclassification model are used to construct the predicted probabilities that 
an observation is truly a job change. In the second step, this generated regressor is included instead 
of the job change dummy variable in the wage growth regression.29,30  
The results from the second step indicate that the impact of changing jobs on wage growth is closer 
to 14 per cent when we control for misclassification (Table 9).31 The comparable estimate from the 
model that ignores misclassification is around 8 per cent (see Pooled OLS model in Table 7). The 
results indicate that failing to control for misclassification leads us to seriously underestimate the 
wage effects of job mobility. 
Sensitivity Analysis: Effect of Different Rates of Measurement Error on Estimates 
This section illustrates the effect different rates of misclassification have on the estimates of job 
mobility in the wage growth regressions. It applies the formula for attenuation bias described in (17) 
and uses a range of misclassification rates to generate corrected OLS estimates. These adjusted 
estimates can be compared to the pooled estimate of 0.0794 from Model 2 in Table 7. Table 10 
reports adjusted OLS estimates for different rates of misclassification. Using the first stage estimates 
of    and     from the previous section generates an adjusted OLS estimate of around 0.10, around 
30 per cent above the pooled OLS estimate in Table 7.  
The table also shows comparable corrected OLS estimates when    is assumed to be equal to zero 
and    varies between 1 per cent and 80 per cent. The corrected estimates indicate that when    is 
low that the adjusted estimates are quite close to the pooled OLS one. However, as    increases the 
adjusted estimate moves increasingly further away from pooled OLS estimate. In addition, the table 
reports corrected OLS estimates when    is 1 per cent and 5 per cent and    is assumed to be equal 
to zero. Even for these relatively low rates of misclassification, the adjusted OLS estimates are quite 
far away from the pooled OLS estimate. This stronger impact from misclassifying job stays arises 
from the fact that the proportion of observed job changes in the sample is around 8 per cent, so the 
proportion of job stays is 92 per cent and therefore the misclassification rate applies to a much 
higher number of cases. 
<Table 10 here> 
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 The identification of the model comes from the fact that certain variables, such as whether a person reports 
if they are overeducated, have children, have undergone recent training and the national unemployment rate, 
are included in the model in the first stage but not in the second stage and also that the predicted probabilities 
are non-linear functions of the explanatory variables. 
30
 The standard errors are adjusted in the second stage to take account of the additional variance due to the 
inclusion of generated regressor as described by Newey and McFadden (1994) and Murphy and Topel (1985).  
31
 The results in Table 9 use a pooled OLS model in the second stage. The comparable estimates using a 




An additional difficulty with investigating the effect of job mobility on wage growth is the possibility 
of reverse causality. This can be addressed using an instrumental variable approach. We need 
instruments that are highly correlated with job mobility and that are uncorrelated with wage 
growth, so they have no independent effect on wage growth other than through job mobility. Here 
thenon-wage aspects of job satisfaction are used as instruments for job mobility. 
Kristensen and Westergård-Nielsen (2004) and Gielen (2008) argue that job satisfaction may be a 
proxy for the worker’s assessment of the quality of the match. Job satisfaction may capture 
unobserved aspects of work, such as the organisation of work, harsh working conditions etc. As 
such, job satisfaction should be a strong predictor of job mobility. However, the difficulty with using 
a measure of overall job satisfaction as an instrument for job mobility is that we expect a worker’s 
satisfaction with earnings to dominate such as measure. Therefore it is likely that overall job 
satisfaction is highly correlated with wage growth. However, the LIS asks workers how satisfied they 
are with different aspects of their job, where satisfaction with earnings is only one component. 
Nonetheless, it may still be the case that satisfaction with earnings influences a worker’s assessment 
of their satisfaction with other aspects of the job and this should be borne in mind when interpreting 
the results. 
Table 11 shows the percentage of workers who are satisfied with various aspects of their jobs.32 
From the table, dissatisfaction with earnings is the most common source of dissatisfaction with the 
job.  
<Table 11 here> 
To assess whether satisfaction with wages affects satisfaction with other aspects of the job, Table 12 
reports the percentage of workers satisfied with other areas of their jobs of those who are not 
satisfied with their earnings. The table shows that high proportions of workers are satisfied with 
other areas of their jobs even though they are unhappy with their earnings. This indicates that 
(dis)satisfaction with earnings may not influence satisfaction with other areas of the job. Therefore, 
the non-wage aspects of job satisfaction may be appropriate instruments for job mobility. 
<Table 12 here> 
The quality of the instruments can be checked by testing their significance in the first stage of the 
two-step approach. The results from the Hausman et al. estimator includes all the exogenous 
variables and all the instruments show that satisfaction with distance to job and working conditions 
are not significant and the coefficient on satisfaction with working hours has the incorrect sign and is 
only significant at the 10 per cent level. Consequently, these three variables are dropped from the 
analysis. Satisfaction with job security, type of work and working times are used as instruments for 
job mobility.33 As before, the probability of truly being a job changer is calculated, and included in 
the wage growth equation in the second step. This controls for both misclassification and 
endogeneity. 
                                                          
32
 Workers are asked to indicate their degree of satisfaction with each area of their work on a scale of 1 to 6, 
where 1 indicates that they are not satisfied at all and 6 indicates that they are fully satisfied. In the table, 
satisfied corresponds to workers who report a level or 4 or above and not satisfied refers to those who report 
a satisfaction level of 3 or below. 
33
 The results from the first-stage are available from the author on request. 
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As discussed earlier, we expect the IV estimates that don’t control for misclassification to be biased 
upwards. Table 13 shows the results from the two-step procedure using IV but where 
misclassification is ignored i.e. the predicted probabilities in the first stage come from a standard 
probit model.  The estimate on the job change dummy variable is around 26 per cent. This compares 
to the pooled OLS estimate of 8 per cent (see Table 7). As expected, the IV estimate is above the OLS 
one, but it is dramatically higher and arguably implausibly large.34 
<Table 13 here> 
Table 14 shows the results from the two-step approach controlling for both endogeneity and 
misclassification. The estimates of the misclassification probabilities from the first stage are 
practically identical to the estimates in Table 9. The second stage IV estimate implies that the impact 
of changing jobs on wage growth is around 13 per cent, when we control for misclassification. This is 
around half the IV estimate that ignores misclassification, implying that ignoring misclassification 
leads to a significant upwards bias in the IV estimate. In addition, the estimate is around 1.6 times 
the size of the pooled OLS estimate but quite similar to the estimate that controls for 
misclassification but ignores the possible reverse causality of job mobility.  The results in tables 13 
and 14 use pooled OLS in the second stage; very similar results are obtained when the random 
effects and IV approach are combined. 
<Table 14 here> 
Table 15 provides a summary of the various estimates of job mobility on wage growth. 
<Table 15 here> 
7. Conclusions 
This paper investigates job mobility in Ireland over the period 1995 to 2001. It finds that there are 
substantial inconsistencies in responses to a question about tenure in the LIS. The extent of the 
measurement error is similar to what has been found in other studies. Survey data on tenure are 
very often used to deduce job changes and given the extent of response error evident in the data it 
is likely that cases are misclassified as job changes when they truly no job change has taken place 
and vice versa. 
The decision to change jobs can be set in a binary choice framework. Misclassification in a binary 
dependent variable can lead to estimates that are biased and inconsistent so it is important to 
control for misclassification. An estimator developed by Hausman et al. is used to control for 
misclassification. The results indicate that, by ignoring misclassification, the true number of job 
changes is underestimated by around 50 per cent.  The average mobility rate is calculated at around 
8 per cent and the estimate for   , the misclassification rate for job changes, implies that the true 
mobility rate is around 12 per cent. In addition, the paper finds that ignoring misclassification leads 
to diminished covariate effects. 
                                                          
34
 This type of estimate is consistent with what Davia (2005) finds when she controls for endogeneity in job 
mobility using ECHP data. For most of the countries in her analysis, the estimates that control for endogeneity 
are multiples of the pooled OLS estimates (see Davia (2005), Table 2, page 24).  
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This paper also adds to the literature on the effect of job mobility on wage growth. It finds an OLS 
estimate of the effect of job mobility on wage growth of around 8 per cent. The wage effects differ 
depending on the reason for job separation. Voluntary job changes are associated with a 14 per cent 
increase in wage growth. However, there is no evidence of wage penalties associated with 
involuntary mobility. This may be attributable to the fact that the sample considered is one where 
workers have a very high attachment to the labour force or it may be due to the very high growth 
rates and tightness in the labour market over the time period under consideration. 
The OLS estimate of the effect of changing jobs on wage growth may be biased due to unobserved 
heterogeneity, reverse causality and also because of measurement error. The paper finds that the 
effect of job mobility on wage growth persists even after controlling for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. The magnitude of the estimates obtained from OLS regressions and regressions that 
control for unobserved heterogeneity are broadly in line with the existing empirical literature. For 
example, OECD (2010) finds a wage premium associated with changing jobs of around 9 per cent for 
Ireland which is very similar to what is found in this paper. However, these estimates ignore 
measurement error in job changes. 
A two-step approach is adopted to control for misclassification in a binary explanatory variable. The 
paper finds that controlling for misclassification has a substantial effect on the estimated impact 
changing jobs has on wage growth; the effect is estimated to be closer to 14 per cent. Finally, 
controlling for reverse causality using an instrumental variables approach and ignoring 
misclassification produces an estimate that seems questionably high; however a more plausible 
















Abbott, M. and C. Beach (1994), “Wage Changes and Job Changes of Canadian Women”, Journal of Human 
Resources, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 429-460. 
Aigner, D.J. (1973), “Regression with a Binary Independent Variable Subject to Errors of Observation”, Journal 
of Econometrics, Vol. 1, pp. 49-60. 
Angrist, J.D. and A. B. Krueger (1999), “Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics”, in Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Volume 3A, O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds), Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier Science. 
Artís, M., Ayuso, M. and M. Guillén (2002), “Detection of Automobile Insurance Fraud with Discrete Choice 
Models and Misclassified Claims”, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 69, No. 3, pp. 325-340. 
Bartel, A. and G. Borjas (1981), “Wage Growth and Job Turnover: An Empirical Analysis”, in Studies in Labor 
Markets, Vol. 3, Rosen S. (ed.), pp. 65-84. University of Chicago Press. 
Baum-Snow, N., and D. Neal (2009), “Mismeasurement of usual hours worked in the Census and ACS”, 
Economic Letters, Vol. 102, Issue 1, (Jan., 2009), pp. 39-41. 
Blumen, I. Kogen, M. and P. McCarthy (1955), “The Industrial Mobility of Labor as a Probability Process”, 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
Bollinger, C.R. (1996), “Bounding Mean Regressions When a Binary Regressor is Mismeasured” Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 73, pp. 387-399. 
Bollinger, C.R. (2001), “Response Error and the Union Wage Differential”, Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 68, 
No. 1, pp. 60-76.  
Bound, J., Brown, C. and N. Mathiowetz (2001), “Measurement Error in Survey Data”, in J. Heckman and E. 
Leamer, eds, Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 5. Elsevier, North Holland. 
Brachet, T. (2008), “Maternal Smoking, Misclassification and Infant Health”, MPRA Working Paper No. 21466. 
Available at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21466/ 
Brown, J. and A. Light (1992), “Interpreting Panel Data on Job Tenure”, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 10, No. 
3 (Jul., 1992), pp. 219-257. 
Campbell, D. (2001), “Estimating the Wage Effects of Job Mobility in Britain” Studies in Economics, No. 0117, 
Department of Economics, University of Kent. 
Card, D. (1996), “The Effect of Unions on the Structure of Wages: A Longitudinal Analysis”, Econometrica, Vol. 
64, No. 4, pp. 957-979. 
Caudill, A. and F. Mixon (2005), “Analysing Misleading Discrete Responses: A Logit Model Based on 
Misclassified Data”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 105-113. 
Davia, M. (2005), “Job Mobility and wage mobility at the beginning of the working career: a comparative view 
across Europe”, ISER Working Paper No. 2005-03, Institute for Social and Economic Research. 
Duncan, G.J. and D.H. Hill (1985), “An Investigation of the Extent and Consequences of Measurement Error in 
Labor-Economic Survey Data”, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, (Oct., 1985), pp. 508-532. 
26 
 
Dustmann, C. and A. van Soest (2004), “An Analysis of Speaking Fluency of Immigrants Using Ordered 
Response Models with Classification Errors”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 
312-321. 
Dustmann, C. and A. van Soest (2001), “Language Fluency and Earnings: Estimation with Misclassified 
Language Indicators”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 663-674. 
Dye, R. and D. McMillen (2007), “Teardowns and land values in the Chicago metropolitan area”, Journal of 
Urban Economics, Vol. 61, pp. 45-63. 
Farber, H. (1999), “Mobility and Stability: The Dynamics of Job Change in Labor Markets”, in O. Ashenfelter and 
D. Card, eds, Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol.3. Elsevier, North Holland. 
Flathmann, J. and S. Sheffrin (2003), “Are Surveys of Taxpayers’ Honesty Honest?”, IIPF Congress Proceedings, 
Prague, August 2003. 
Frazis, H. and M.A. Loewenstein (2003), “Estimating Linear Regressions with Mismeasured, Possibly 
Endogenous, Binary Explanatory Variables”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 117, No. 1, pp. 151-178. 
Freeman, R.B. (1984), “Longitudinal Analysis of the Effects of Trade Unions”, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 
2, No. 1, pp. 1-26. 
Garcia Perez, J.I. and Y. Rebollo Sanz (2005), “Wage changes through job mobility in Europe: A multinomial 
endogenous switching approach”, Labour Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 531-555.  
Gielen, A.C. (2008), “Repeated Job Quits: Stepping Stones or Learning about Quality?”, IZA Discussion Paper 
No. 3838. 
Hausman, J., Abrevaya, J. and F.M. Scott-Morton (1998), “Misclassification of the dependent variable in a 
discrete-response setting”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87, pp. 239-269. 
Hausman, J. (2001), “Mismeasured Variables in Econometric Analysis: Problems from the Right and Problems 
from the Left”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Aut., 2001), pp. 57-67. 
Jensen, P., Palangkaraya, A. and E. Webster (2008), “Misclassification between Patent Offices: Evidence from a 
Matched Sample of Patent Applications”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 1063-
1075. Kane, T., C.E. Rouse and D.O. Staiger (1999), “Estimating Returns to Schooling when Schooling is 
Misreported”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7235. 
Keith, K. and A. McWilliams (1999), “The Returns to Mobility and Job Search by Gender”, Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, Vol. 52, No. 3, (Apr., 1999), pp. 460-477. 
Kenkel, D., Lillard, D. and A. Mathios (2004), “Accounting for misclassification error in retrospective smoking 
data”, Health Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 1031-1044. 
Kristensen, N. and N. Westergård-Nielsen (2004), “Does Low Job Satisfaction Lead to Job Mobility?, IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 1026. 
Le Grand, C. and M Tahlin (2002), “Job mobility and earnings growth”, European Sociological Review, Vol.18, 
No. 4, pp. 381-400. 
Light, A. and K. McGarry (1998), “Job Change Patterns and the Wages of Young Men”, The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 276-286. 
27 
 
Mahajan, A. (2006), “Identification and Estimation of Regression Models with Misclassification”, Econometrica, 
Vol. 74, No. 3, (May, 2006), pp. 631-665. 
Mincer, J. (1986), “Wage Changes in Job Changes”, in Research in Labor Markets, Rosen S. (ed.), NBER and 
University of Chicago Press, pp. 21-63. 
Munasinghe, L. and K. Sigman (2004), “A Hobo Syndrome? Mobility, Wages and Job Turnover”, Labour 
Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 191-218.  
Murphy, K. and R. Topel (1985), “Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econometric Models”, Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics, Vol. 3, No. 4, (Oct., 1985), pp. 370-379.  
Newey, W. K., and D. McFadden (1994), “Large Sample Estimation and Hypothesis Testing”, in R. F. Engle, and 
D. L. McFadden, eds, Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 4. Elsevier, North Holland. 
OECD (2010), “Institutional and Policy Determinants of Labour Market Flows”, Chapter 3 in 2010 OECD 
Employment Outlook: Moving Beyond the Jobs Crisis. 
Pavlopoulos, D., Fouarge, D., Muffels., R. and J. Vermunt (2007), “Who benefits from a job change: The dwarfs 
or the giants?”, IRISS Working Papers, No. 2007-16, December 2007. 
Topel, R. and M. Ward (1992), “Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 107 (May, 1992), pp. 430-479. 
Ureta, M. (1992), “The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, Revisited”, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 82, No. 1, pp. 322-335. 
Weiss, D., Dawis, R., England, G. and L. Lofquist (1961), “Validity of Work Histories Obtained by Interview”, 
Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota. 








Tables & Figures 
 
Table 1: Number of Workers and Job Changes 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Revolving Balanced Panel 2,292 2,247 2,217 2,179 2,179 2,195 2,239 
Number of workers 1,163 1,175 1,211 1,276 1,341 1,376 1,434 
Number of Job Changes  76 85 102 139 146 184 156 
Job Mobility Rate 6.5% 7.2% 8.4% 10.9% 10.9% 13.4% 10.9% 
 
 
Table 2: Consistency of Starting Dates within Jobs  
  Jobs with a Majority of Starting Dates: 





Number of jobs 1,755 352 649 741 1,014 
% of Jobs  20% 37% 42% 58% 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey 
      
Number of jobs 3,318 246 1,170 1,514 1,804 
% of Jobs  7% 35% 46% 54% 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, taken from Brown and Light (1992) 
 
 
Table 3: Consistency of the Majority of Starting Dates within Jobs 
  Jobs with a Majority of Starting Dates: 





Number of jobs 1,755 654 1,471 1,513 242 
% of Jobs  37% 84% 86% 14% 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey 
      
Number of jobs 3,318 676 2,116 2,471 847 
% of Jobs  20% 64% 74% 26% 












All inconsistencies at least 
3 years prior to date job is 
first observed 
Remaining jobs 
Number of jobs 1,755 352 722 681 
% of Jobs  20% 41% 39% 
 
 
Table 5: Average Within-Person Wage Growth  
 
 










All Workers 1,206 0.085 0.005 0.01 0.06 0.13 
       
Job Stayer 766 0.072 0.006 0.01 0.05 0.11 
Job Mover 440 0.109 0.011 0.02 0.08 0.17 
       
Voluntary Job Mover 223 0.118 0.014 0.03 0.10 0.17 
Involuntary Job Mover 78 0.092 0.030 0.01 0.05 0.23 
Other Movers 139 0.105 0.018 0.03 0.08 0.17 
       
Move Once 256 0.101 0.015 0.01 0.07 0.16 
Move more than Once 184 0.120 0.014 0.03 0.11 0.18 
 
 
Table 6: Average Wage Growth for Job Stays and Job Moves 
 
 












All Observations 5,346 0.070 0.004 -0.051 0.045 0.190 
       
Job Stays 4,897 0.061 0.004 -0.051 0.041 0.172 
Job Moves 449 0.167 0.019 -0.048 0.134 0.383 
       
Voluntary Job Moves 282 0.200 0.025 -0.022 0.190 0.422 
Involuntary Job Moves 103 0.094 0.040 -0.113 0.076 0.328 
Other Moves 64 0.140 0.046 -0.054 0.073 0.334 
       
First Move 232 0.177 0.026 -0.042 0.155 0.395 










Table 7: Wage Growth Models 
 No Additional 
Regressors 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
         






Coef Std Error 
Job Change 0.1064*** 0.0178 0.0794*** 0.0182 0.1122*** 0.0237 0.0805*** 0.0183 
         
Age   -0.0110** 0.0043 -0.0211 0.0267 -0.0113** 0.0044 
Age Squared   0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002*** 0.0001 
Experience   -0.0019 0.0022 0.0062 0.0210 -0.0017 0.0022 
Experience Squared   0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
Female   0.0014 0.0065   0.0016 0.0066 
Education: (ref: Low 
Education) 
        
Education - Medium   -0.0087 0.0073   -0.0086 0.0074 
Education - High   0.0078 0.0110   0.0080 0.0111 
Public Sector   0.0070 0.0098 -0.0028 0.0282 0.0073 0.0100 
No. Employees > 50   -0.0244*** 0.0067 -0.0497*** 0.0147 -0.0251*** 0.0068 
Occupation: (ref: 
Elementary Occupations) 
        
    Manager   -0.0016 0.0111 -0.0076 0.0278 -0.0013 0.0113 
    Professional   0.0210** 0.0099 -0.0015 0.0268 0.0212** 0.0101 
    Clerk   0.0186** 0.0092 0.0106 0.0240 0.0190** 0.0093 
    Skilled   0.0125 0.0114 0.0385 0.0329 0.0128 0.0117 
Sector of Origin: (ref: 
Non-Market Services) 
        
    Ag., Mining & Utilities   0.0073 0.0184 0.1026* 0.0606 0.0080 0.0189 
    Manufacturing   -0.0108 0.0130 0.0269 0.0383 -0.0107 0.0133 
    Construction   0.0133 0.0181 0.0799** 0.0389 0.0137 0.0184 
    Market Services   0.0037 0.0097 0.0501* 0.0298 0.0039 0.0099 
Year Dummies:         
    1996   -0.0168 0.0167   -0.0166 0.0167 
    1997   0.0139 0.0155   0.0140 0.0155 
    1998   -0.0199 0.0146   -0.0198 0.0145 
    1999   -0.0069 0.0144   -0.0070 0.0144 
    2000   0.0120 0.0140   0.0120 0.0140 
    2001   -0.0072 0.0149   -0.0072 0.0149 
Constant 0.0608*** 0.0028 0.2987*** 0.0707 0.3859 0.4649 0.3021*** 0.0716 
         
Obs. 5,346 5,320 5,320 5,320 
Number of People   1,205 1,205 
R-squared within   0.0157 0.0144 
R-squared between   0.0281 0.0715 
R-squared overall   0.0156 0.0294 
R-squared 0.0112 0.0294   
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
Prob > chi squared    0.0000 
F test that all        F(1,204, 4,100)=0.68  
      
       chi-squared(1)=162.76 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by person. In the table * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5% and *** to 1% 
level of significance. 
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Table 8:  Random Effects Wage Growth Models, Controlling for Type of Job Mobility 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
      






Job Change 0.1068*** 0.0182     
       
Voluntary Job Change   0.1397*** 0.0242   
Involuntary Job Change   0.0335 0.0380   
Other type of Job Change   0.0791* 0.0479   
       
First Job Change     0.1153*** 0.0264 
Second plus Job Change     0.0973*** 0.0241 
       
Obs. 5,346   5,346   5,346   
Number of People 1,206   1,206   1,206   
R-squared within 0.0095  0.0115  0.0093  
R-squared between 0.0142  0.0154  0.0156  
R-squared overall 0.0112  0.0134  0.0113  
Prob > chi squared 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  




















Table 9: Effect of Job Mobility on Wage Growth Controlling for Misclassification 
 First Stage Estimates    
 
Misclassification Model  Reference: Probit Estimates 
 Marginal Effects P>|Z|  Marginal Effects P>|Z| 
0ˆ  0.0025 0.77    
1ˆ  0.5113 0.03    
Experience -0.0329 0.02  -0.0086 0.00 
Experience squared 0.0005 0.05  0.0001 0.00 
Female -0.0289 0.16  -0.0112 0.17 
Child -0.0040 0.85  -0.0014 0.88 
Living in a Couple -0.0111 0.65  -0.0042 0.68 
(Ref: Education – low)      
Education- medium -0.0385 0.10  -0.0186 0.02 
Education- high -0.0505 0.21  -0.0214 0.07 
Recent Training 0.1088 0.07  0.0389 0.00 
Public Sector -0.0692 0.02  -0.0312 0.00 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0457 0.06  -0.0188 0.01 
Overskilled 0.0662 0.00  0.0297 0.00 
Occupation of Origin:      
(Ref: Elementary Occ’s)      
    Manager -0.0975 0.03  -0.0432 0.00 
    Professional -0.0791 0.00  -0.0362 0.00 
    Clerk -0.0807 0.05  -0.0337 0.00 
    Skilled -0.0794 0.00  -0.0373 0.00 
Sector of Origin:      
(Ref: Non Market Services)      
    Agric. & Mining & Utilities -0.0791 0.08  -0.0351 0.01 
    Manufacturing     -0.0559 0.14  -0.0234 0.09 
    Building 0.1536 0.09  0.0572 0.00 
    Market Services 0.0443 0.22  0.0188 0.14 
Year Dummies:      
(Ref: 1995)      
     1996 -0.0068 0.81  -0.0022 0.85 
     1997 0.0032 0.91  0.0028 0.83 
     1998 0.0458 0.34  0.0180 0.22 
     1999 0.0343 0.44  0.0166 0.31 
     2000 0.0587 0.30  0.0261 0.15 
     2001 0.0244 0.63  0.0100 0.59 
Unemployment Rate -0.0226 0.10  -0.0058 0.07 
      
      
      
 Second Stage Estimates    
 Coeff Std Error    
Job Change 0.1372 0.0532    
Number of Observations 5,217     
R-squared 0.0238     
Prob > F 0.0000     
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by person. The standard errors in the second stage are adjusted to take 
account of the fact that a generated regressor is included. The second stage regression includes the predicted 








Reference:   
Pooled OLS estimate (Table 7) 0.0794*** 0.0182 
   
Corrected OLS Estimates:   
Using 
0 =0.0025 and 1 =0.5113 (from Table 9) 0.1008  
   
Varying 1  (assume 0 =0):   
1 =0.01 0.0795  
1 =0.05 0.0802  
1 =0.10 0.0811  
1 =0.20 0.0832  
1 =0.30 0.0860  
1 =0.40 0.0902  
1 =0.50 0.0968  
1 =0.60 0.1086  
1 =0.70 0.1364  
1 =0.80 0.2798  
   
Varying 
0  (assume 1 =0):   
0 =0.01 0.0903  
0 =0.05 0.2131  
 
Table 11: Satisfaction with Various Aspects of Job 
 % Satisfied % Not Satisfied 
Satisfied with:   
Earnings 67% 33% 
Job Security 82% 18% 
Type of Work 90% 10% 
Number of Hours 83% 17% 
Distance to Job/Commuting 88% 12% 
Working Times (i.e. daytime, night-time, shifts etc.) 88% 12% 
Working conditions/environment in place of work 88% 12% 
 
Table 12: Satisfaction with Various Aspects of Job for those not Satisfied with Earnings 
 % Satisfied % Not Satisfied 
Satisfied with other aspects of job, if not satisfied with earnings:   
Job Security 66% 34% 
Type of Work 80% 20% 
Number of Hours 70% 30% 
Distance to Job/Commuting 83% 17% 
Working Times (i.e. daytime, night-time, shifts etc.) 81% 19% 




Table 13: Second Stage IV Estimates of Job Mobility on Wage Growth^ 
 Estimate Standard Error 
Job Change 0.2590*** 0.0706 
   
Number of Observations 4,428  
R-squared 0.0275  
Prob > F 0.0000  
^ Notes: * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5% and *** to 1% level of significance. Standard errors are clustered by 
person. The standard errors in the second stage are also adjusted to take account of the fact that a generated 
regressor is included in the model. The second stage model includes the same controls as the pooled OLS model 




Table 14: IV Estimates of Job Mobility on Wage Growth, Controlling for Misclassification^ 
 Estimate Standard Error 
First Stage Estimates   
0ˆ  0.0072** 0.0030 
1ˆ  0.5107*** 0.1337 
   
Second Stage Estimates   
Job Change 0.1242*** 0.0348 
   
Number of Observations 4,428  
R-squared 0.0274  
Prob > F 0.0000  
^ Notes: * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5% and *** to 1% level of significance. Standard errors are clustered by 
person. The standard errors in the second stage are also adjusted to take account of the fact that a generated 
regressor is included in the model. The second stage model includes the same controls as the pooled OLS model 
in Table 7. The first stage model includes the same controls as the first stage model in Table 9 as well as the 
three instruments. 
 
Table 15: Summary of Estimates of Job Mobility on Wage Growth 
 Estimate Standard Error 
Pooled OLS (Table 7) 0.0794*** 0.0182 
Random Effects (Table 7) 0.0805*** 0.0183 
Controlling for Misclassification (Table 9) 0.1372** 0.0532 
IV (Table 13) 0.2590*** 0.0706 
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